French v. LaBatte, 2025 ONCAT 195

CONDOMINIUM AUTHORITY TRIBUNAL

DATE: November 26, 2025 CASE: 2024-00702N Citation: French v. LaBatte, 2025 ONCAT 195

Order under Rule 19 of the Condominium Authority Tribunal’s Rules of Practice

Member: Patricia McQuaid, Vice-Chair

The Applicant: Sarah French, Self-Represented The Respondent: Carolyn LaBatte, Self-Represented The Intervenor: Wentworth Standard Condominium Corporation No. 4, Did not participate

Submission Dates: November 11 to November 18, 2025

DISMISSAL ORDER

1Sarah French (the “Applicant”), the owner of a unit of Wentworth Standard Condominium Corporation No. 4 (“WSCC 4”), initially started the application process with the Condominium Authority Tribunal in November 2024 and finalized and submitted the application in August 2025.

2The Applicant alleges that Carolyn LaBatte (the “Respondent”), also a unit owner, is harassing her through derogatory, discriminatory, and defamatory statements, stalking, persistent unsolicited contact, threatening, provoking and inciting verbal confrontations, all contrary to s. 117(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 (the “Act”) and WSCC 4’s rules. When she filed her application, the Applicant requested that the Tribunal permanently ban the Respondent from serving on WSCC 4’s board due to her harassment of unit owners and that WSCC 4 be required to add an anti-harassment policy to its governing documents.

3WSCC 4 did not participate in the Stage 2 mediation.

4For the reasons set out below, this application is dismissed under Rule 19 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice – this is a case about issues that the Tribunal has no legal power to decide.

5At the outset of this Stage 3 proceeding, the Applicant clarified that she is relying upon s. 117(2) of the Act on the basis that she alleges the Respondent has created unreasonable noise that is a nuisance, annoyance and disruption, by shouting and yelling at her on numerous occasions and by sending unsolicited emails. She stated that the source and frequency of these emails at any hour of the day have affected her right to use and enjoy her unit. Further, she asserts that other prescribed nuisances of unreasonable vibration and light are caused by the Respondent; specifically, the vibration alerts on her phone and the screen lighting up when she receives emails. The Applicant also clarified that in terms of specific relief she requests that the Respondent be ordered not to contact or communicate with her or her family, directly or indirectly through other residents or unit owners, and that the Respondent be required to pay compensation to the Applicant for harassment and infringement on her rights as a unit owner.

6The Applicant advised that although WSCC 4 does not have an anti-harassment rule, she is relying on two WSCC 4’s rules. The first of these, Rule I actually reads as a preamble to the rules that follow. The second, Rule VI -1 states:

Owners and their families, guests, visitors … shall not create nor permit the creation of any noise or nuisance which, in the opinion of the Board, may or does disturb the comfort or quiet enjoyment of the Common Elements and Units by residents, or their respective families.

7After receiving this information from the Applicant, I asked the parties to provide their proposed lists of documents and witnesses that they would be relying upon in the hearing. The Applicant stated that she intended to have a former board member, whose tenure on the board overlapped with hers and the Respondent’s, provide evidence as to the Respondent’s harassment of her and others as a pattern of behavior. In terms of documents, the Applicant proposed to provide many “unsolicited” emails as well as many examples of “harassment and unprofessional communications to her during Board discussions.” The Respondent stated that she intended to have the two current board members give evidence about board meetings, her own conduct as a board member as well as the Applicant’s.

8In response to the list of witnesses proposed by the Respondent, the Applicant stated that each of them is subject to a ‘no contact’ order with her through the Hamilton Police Service.

9After reviewing the proposed document and witness lists, I advised the parties that I questioned whether this matter is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and whether the Tribunal is the proper forum for the dispute between the parties. I noted that the allegations described in paragraph 2 above, as well as the allegations made that she has suffered threats and personal attacks from the Respondent, appear to fall under s. 117(1) of the Act, which states that no person shall carry on an activity in the unit or on the common elements if that activity is likely to cause injury or illness to an individual. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over matters that fall within s. 117(1). Therefore, referring to Rule 19 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice, I asked the Applicant to provide me with her reasons and explanation as to why this matter should not be dismissed.

10Rule 19 states that the Tribunal may dismiss a case at any time in certain situations, including:

a) Where a case is about issues so minor that it would be unfair to make the respondent(s) go through the CAT process to respond to the applicant’s concerns;

b) Where a case has no reasonable prospect of success;

c) Where a case is about issues that the CAT has no legal power to hear or decide;

d) Where the applicant(s) is using the CAT for an improper purpose (e.g. filing vexatious application).

11In her response, the Applicant stated that the Respondent issued legal threats against her and has made verbal and written personal attacks. She also advised that on October 24, after the Stage 2 mediation, she filed a ‘no contact’ order against the Respondent, also with the Hamilton Police Service. This order has apparently not yet been served on the Respondent. She stated that that order will address” future criminal but not nuisance harassment” and “does not hold [the Respondent] accountable for past criminal or nuisance harassment.” The Applicant asserted again that the current WSCC 4 board “refuses to pass an anti-harassment bylaw or take harassment seriously”.

12This submission highlights a key aspect of the Applicant’s case – that it is principally about disagreements, and likely much acrimony, on the WSCC 4 board. Disputes of this nature, and they may well be serious, are not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide. WSCC 4 is a 20-unit condominium with a three-person board. Currently there is a vacancy on the board because the Applicant ceased being a board member on October 2, 2025. She is clearly frustrated that the board has refused to put in place an anti-harassment provision (something that the Tribunal cannot mandate that it do). The Applicant subsequently, and during the course of this case, filed a no contact order against the Respondent - in effect, the very remedy she seeks from the Tribunal.

13The Applicant explained in her response that some of the Respondent’s actions were not severe forms of harassment that made her fear for her safety, harmed her or damaged her property as stipulated in s. 117(1) of the Act; rather, some of her actions “occurred in a nuisance type way after I asked her to stop, like telling me about a rebate.” Even if I were to accept that the Applicant is not claiming that she is experiencing injury of any kind, and that therefore this is not a dispute falling within s. 117(1), the claims also do not fall within s. 117(2) of the Act. The Applicant seeks to insert her claims within s. 117 (2) by asserting that the Respondent’s occasional yelling at the Applicant is a noise nuisance and by alleging that the manner of communication - her phone receiving texts – results in light and vibration disturbances that amount to a nuisance. To qualify for prohibition under s. 117(2), the noise, light and vibration must be, in and of themselves, unreasonable and resulting in a nuisance, annoyance, or disruption. Raised voices, and the light and vibration from phone notifications when messages are received (which are, in fact, subject to the control of the owner of the phone) do not meet the necessary requirements for prohibition under s. 117(2).

14The Applicant referred me to the Tribunal’s decision in Holloway v. Roberts, 2025 ONCAT 181 (“Holloway”) for the proposition that harassing conduct could be considered a nuisance. In Holloway, where the condominium corporation had a detailed harassment rule, the Tribunal clearly stated that it does not have jurisdiction to hear applications specifically about harassment or harassment rules. At paragraphs 6 and 7 of the decision, the Tribunal stated:

The Tribunal may have the authority to address conduct characterized as harassing, if the provisions at issue fall under s. 1 (1) (d) (iii.2) of O. Reg. 179/17 which allows the Tribunal to hear disputes about “provisions that prohibit, restrict or otherwise govern any other nuisance, annoyance or disruption to an individual in a unit, the common elements or the assets, if any, of the corporation.”

Section 1 (1) (d) (iii.2) of O. Reg. 179/17 does not give the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear all disputes over rules that deal with behaviour that is inappropriate, or which may seem intolerable. However, disputes involving rules when the alleged behaviour causes a nuisance, annoyance for disruption at law to an individual, may fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

15Therefore, there must be a provision in the governing documents that prohibits, restricts, or otherwise governs any other nuisance, annoyance or disruption. As is clear here, there is no anti-harassment provision which distinguishes this case factually, to a significant extent, from Holloway. The Applicant directed me to Rule VI-1 as set out in paragraph 6 above. The rule is worded in such a way to give the board the authority to take compliance action when there is a noise or nuisance which the board determines interferes with a resident’s comfort or quiet enjoyment of their unit. It does not specifically mention harassment, but in any event would not be applicable where (a) the harassment does not qualify as a nuisance at law and (b) it does not appear to the board to be interfering with a resident’s enjoyment of the property. As noted above, the board has chosen not to participate in this case (perhaps complicated by the fact that Applicant has no contact orders against the two remaining board members).

16There is little question, based on her submissions, that the Applicant finds her interactions with the Respondent, whether through discussions or receipt of “unsolicited” emails to be personally annoying and intolerable for her. But this does not equate to a nuisance, annoyance or disruption at law and does not fall within the purview of the rule.

17After careful consideration of all the Applicant’s submissions during this proceeding, I conclude that this case should be dismissed. The Applicant has attempted to frame her dispute as a nuisance issue that the Tribunal can address under s. 117(2) of the Act or under s, 1 (1) (d) (iii.2) of O. Reg. 179//17, but, as noted in paragraph 13, she has not raised issues of unreasonable noise or other prescribed nuisance as per the Act, nor is there a rule that would bring this dispute into the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s. 1(1)(d)(iii.2). Characterizing activities or behaviors one does not like as a “nuisance” does not make it so for the purposes of the Act.

18It is apparent that the matters raised by the Applicant are at their core governance issues - disputes between current and former board members. In a condominium of only 20 units, this is an extremely unfortunate situation. It would be an understatement to suggest that governance issues and consequent dysfunction appear to be rife among some in the WSCC 4 community, as highlighted by the Applicant turning to the police for no contact orders. However, an application to the Tribunal is not the appropriate avenue for resolution of these problems.

ORDER

19The Tribunal orders that the application be dismissed.

Patricia McQuaid

Vice Chair, Condominium Authority Tribunal