Carolyne Kerr

The accused, a gymnastics coach, was charged with sexual interference and luring in relation to a young female athlete he coached.

The Crown alleged the accused repeatedly touched the complainant's buttocks during training and later sent her pictures of his genitals via Snapchat.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the competing testimonies.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and noted the absence of corroborating evidence, including the missing Snapchat photos.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding both the actus reus and mens rea of the offences.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant sought relief from a forfeiture order relating to residential property forfeited as offence-related property and proceeds of crime following a relative’s conviction for conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The applicant claimed an interest in the property based on a $150,000 loan used toward its purchase and argued he held either an equitable mortgage or constructive trust interest.

The court found no intention by the parties to secure the loan against the property and therefore no equitable mortgage or resulting interest arose.

The court further held that a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment was unavailable because the applicant was merely an unsecured creditor and Parliament’s statutory forfeiture scheme constituted a juristic reason for the Crown’s enrichment.

Although the applicant appeared innocent of complicity or collusion in the offences, the absence of any legal or equitable interest in the property required dismissal of the application.

The accused applied for a second bail review after a prior review had been dismissed by another Superior Court judge.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to review the original justice of the peace’s decision or only the earlier review decision, concluding that under s. 520(8) of the Criminal Code and the authority of Saracino, the review was limited to assessing the earlier judge’s decision.

The applicant argued there had been a material change in circumstances and that the earlier judge misapplied the test from St‑Cloud in light of subsequent appellate authority.

The court found that the alleged new evidence, including statements by a co‑accused during sentencing, was not credible or capable of affecting the bail determination and therefore did not constitute a material change.

The court further held that the prior reviewing judge made no material error in principle and that detention on primary and secondary grounds remained justified.