Bradley J. Troup

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability, sex, gender identity, gender expression, record of offences, and reprisal against a community health centre and a registered nurse.

The allegations stemmed from a medical appointment where the nurse asked health questions and subsequently consulted a physician, who reported the applicant to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, resulting in a license suspension.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success as the applicant failed to link the treatment to a protected ground or establish an intention to reprise.

The applicant filed a request to reactivate her deferred human rights application following the conclusion of a related WSIAT proceeding.

The respondent opposed the request, arguing it was filed outside the 60-day time limit under Rule 14.4.

The Tribunal found that while the request was approximately two weeks late, the applicant provided a reasonable explanation based on a mistaken belief about the WSIAT deadline.

Given the short delay and lack of significant prejudice to the respondents, the Tribunal waived the time limit and granted the request to reactivate the application.

The respondents requested an order to defer the human rights application pending the completion of proceedings before the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT).

The applicant opposed the deferral, arguing that the human rights application raised issues beyond those before WSIAT and that a deferral would cause undue delay.

The Tribunal found that while there was an overlap of facts and issues, it was not appropriate to defer the application indefinitely because no hearing date had yet been set by WSIAT.

The request to defer was denied, with leave to revisit the issue once a WSIAT hearing date is scheduled.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and age, as well as reprisal, regarding his housing.

The respondent brought a preliminary issue seeking dismissal under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matters were already dealt with by the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB).

The Tribunal found that the applicant had raised substantially similar allegations, including failure to accommodate a request for a designated handicap parking spot and harassment, at a prior LTB hearing.

Concluding that the substance of the application had been appropriately dealt with by the LTB, the Tribunal dismissed the application.

The applicant, a transgender woman, sought to withdraw her human rights application alleging discrimination by a women's-only fitness facility.

The respondents requested costs or a monetary award for abuse of process, citing the stigma and expense of defending the claim.

The Tribunal accepted the withdrawal and dismissed the request for costs, finding it lacked statutory authority to award costs under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act because it had not enacted the requisite rules.

The Tribunal also found no abuse of process by the applicant.

In a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation regarding admission to a women's only fitness facility, the respondents sought production of various documents and particulars.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant, a pre-operative transsexual at the time of the incident, to produce medical records relating to her transsexual surgery and treating physician.

The Tribunal dismissed the respondents' requests for documents relating to the bona fides of the applicant's membership application, counselling notes, restraining orders, and further particulars, finding them not arguably relevant to the issues of liability or necessary for a fair hearing.

The applicant, a transgender woman, alleged discrimination in the provision of services on the basis of sex after being denied admission to a women-only fitness facility.

The respondents filed a Notice of Constitutional Question, arguing that a finding of discrimination would violate women's freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter, and that the human rights process violated the personal respondent's rights under sections 7 and 11(b) of the Charter.

The respondents sought to have these constitutional issues determined before the hearing on the merits.

The Tribunal ordered that the section 7 and 11(b) arguments be determined via written submissions during an adjournment necessitated by the applicant's health, while the section 2(d) argument would be dealt with at the hearing on the merits.