B. Kelly

The parties brought competing motions regarding the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The father sought exclusive possession, while the mother, who resided in the home with the children, sought partition and sale.

The court dismissed the father's claim for exclusive possession, finding no basis for it.

The court granted the mother's request for partition and sale, noting the prima facie right to sale, the unsustainable carrying costs, and the lack of prejudice to the father.

The court also ordered that the mother receive 50% of the net proceeds of the sale immediately, with the remainder held in trust.

The applicant brought a motion for the immediate partition and sale of a home jointly owned by the unmarried parties, and requested that the proceeds be held in trust pending trial.

The respondent opposed an immediate sale, seeking to delay closing until the end of the school year and requesting an immediate 50% disbursement of the proceeds.

The court found that the respondent failed to establish sufficient reason to refuse the sale, noting the applicant's unsustainable carrying costs.

The court ordered the property to be listed for sale with a closing date no sooner than January 31, 2023, and directed that $150,000 be disbursed to each party from the net proceeds, with the remainder paid into court.

Following the execution of an Anton Piller order in a commercial dispute, certain seized documents were identified as relating to “controlled goods” under the Defence Production Act.

The moving party sought an order declaring that the independent supervising solicitor appointed under the Anton Piller order was not required to register under Part 2 of the Defence Production Act in order to possess or examine such documents.

The Attorney General of Canada intervened and argued that the registration requirements applied.

The court held that an independent supervising solicitor appointed under the Model Anton Piller Order functions as a person employed for the execution of civil process and qualifies as a “peace officer” within the meaning of the Criminal Code for the limited purpose of the statutory exemption.

Accordingly, the solicitor was exempt from the registration requirement under s. 36 of the Defence Production Act.

Following the dismissal of a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the responding defendants sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court considered Rule 20.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and rejected the argument that substantial indemnity costs should presumptively apply, noting the rule no longer creates such a presumption.

The court also held that the defendants’ Offer to Settle did not trigger Rule 49.10 because it lacked a genuine element of compromise and included a demand for substantial indemnity costs.

Given that the plaintiff would likely recover some damages at trial, the court determined that the most appropriate course was to reserve the costs of the motion to the trial judge for determination in the context of the overall proceeding.

In a wrongful dismissal action brought under the simplified procedure, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking determination of the reasonable notice period and damages.

The court held that although reasonable notice issues may in appropriate cases be determined summarily using the Bardal factors, the case also raised a contested issue regarding whether the plaintiff reasonably mitigated her damages.

Evidence concerning the plaintiff’s job search and the availability of alternate nursing employment created a factual dispute that would benefit from oral evidence and cross‑examination.

Relying on guidance from Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch regarding summary judgment in Rule 76 actions, the court found that deciding only the notice period would not promote procedural efficiency.

The motion was therefore dismissed and the matter directed to proceed toward trial.