Aaron Blumenfeld

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a home builder, had sued the defendant land developer and its principal for breach of contract, various torts, and oppression arising from a completed agreement of purchase and sale.

The court systematically analyzed all nine causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff and found that each failed to plead the necessary material facts or relied on non-existent legal duties.

The court struck all claims without leave to amend and dismissed the action.

The applicant brought a motion seeking declarations that his 99-year-old mother was incapable of managing property and instructing counsel, and seeking the appointment of a litigation guardian and guardian of property.

The court reviewed competing capacity assessments and preferred the assessment finding incapacity, noting the mother's confusion and inability to understand the litigation.

The court appointed a neutral third-party lawyer as litigation guardian and guardian of property, passing over the mother's other son due to extreme family conflict and a prior finding of unconscionable procurement.

The court also ordered the mother's counsel to pay $3,500 in costs personally for taking unreasonable positions and failing to address his client's lack of capacity.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order for his 99-year-old mother to undergo a capacity assessment pursuant to s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, and for the continuation of the Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL).

The applicant raised concerns about his mother's capacity to act as estate trustee following her examination out of court, where she provided non-responsive answers and demonstrated a lack of understanding of the estate's multi-million dollar debts.

The court found that the mother's capacity was in issue and ordered the assessment, balancing her privacy rights against the need to protect the vulnerable estate.

The court also granted a mandatory injunction to continue the ETDL's mandate to maintain the status quo pending the capacity assessment and the main application.

The applicant's estate sought costs for a successful dependent's support motion.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $84,456.11 against the respondent estate trustee and the estate jointly and severally, citing the respondent's vituperative opposition and the applicant's unaccepted offer to settle.

A supporting respondent's request for costs was dismissed as there was no lis between him and the opposing respondent.

The respondent brought a motion to stay an application commenced by the applicant to set aside a Notice to Arbitrate.

The core issue was whether the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement regarding a family business dispute.

The court found that the applicant's counsel only had authority to negotiate comprehensive minutes of settlement, not to bind the applicant to the material terms or 'deal points' proposed by the respondent.

As there was no mutual intention to agree, no binding settlement was reached.

The motion for a stay and the application to appoint an arbitrator were dismissed, and the application to set aside the Notice to Arbitrate was granted.

During a case management conference in a complex multi-party family and corporate dispute, a party objected to an opposing party's recent retainer of new counsel on the eve of scheduled examinations, alleging a historical conflict of interest.

To avoid derailing the long-established litigation schedule with a formal motion to remove counsel, the case management judge invoked Rule 50.13(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Citing the culture shift mandated by Hryniak v. Mauldin, the judge summarily ordered that the opposing party could not be represented by the newly retained counsel at this time, finding the retainer to be an act of tactical mischief designed to delay proceedings.

The plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant brought cross-motions for summary judgment in an action for breach of a commercial lease agreement.

The dispute centered on whether a binding lease existed for the expansion of the tenant's premises and whether the tenant breached duties of good faith and honest performance by secretly securing an alternative location while delaying the provision of design information.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the case presented a plethora of genuine issues for trial, including serious credibility issues, which could not be fairly and justly resolved using the summary judgment procedure.

The applicant, a 64-year-old man with significant health issues, brought a motion for temporary dependant's support from his late father's estate.

The respondent, the applicant's mother and sole beneficiary, had distributed the entire estate to herself without applying for probate.

The court found credible evidence that the applicant was a dependant and ordered the respondent to pay $5,000 per month in temporary support plus a $5,000 lump sum.

The court also held that the limitation period for the claim had not expired because it only begins to run upon a grant of probate, which had never been obtained.

The applicant, Nasjjec, brought applications to set aside several arbitration awards made by the Arbitrator regarding the dissolution of a partnership that owned a commercial office building.

Nasjjec argued that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, failed to treat the parties equally and fairly, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent, Nuyork, brought a cross-application to enforce the awards.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Nasjjec's applications, finding that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law and that the Arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, within his jurisdiction, and procedurally fair.

The court granted Nuyork's application to enforce the arbitral awards and awarded costs to Nuyork on a partial indemnity basis.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.

Following a fraudulent conveyance trial in which allegations of conspiracy and damages against a defendant were rejected, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs.

Although the court had found the defendant assisted in attempts to hinder collection efforts, it declined to impose damages and granted no substantive relief against her.

The court held that her status as a contemnor did not bar a costs award, particularly given that the plaintiffs had pursued duplicative litigation contrary to earlier representations and had failed to prove damages.

Substantial indemnity costs were warranted due to unproven allegations of fraud and the breach of a prior representation to the court.

Costs of $665,990.96 were awarded jointly and severally against the opposing parties, with a solicitor’s lien recognized under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendants, previously found in contempt of multiple court orders relating to bankruptcy and asset disclosure, sought an order requiring broad disclosure of documents from the plaintiffs for an upcoming contempt sanction hearing.

The court considered privilege claims over numerous documents, including solicitor‑client communications, settlement communications, and materials arising from joint retainers.

The court held that several documents were not protected or that privilege was displaced by competing public interests, including the integrity of ex parte orders and prior incarceration resulting from the proceedings.

Evidence suggesting potential fraud by related corporate actors and possible nondisclosure in earlier applications justified expanded disclosure.

The court ordered production of specified materials and directed that the corporate plaintiff produce all further relevant documents subject to a privilege schedule.